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Abstract 
Despite the widespread acceptance of Friedman and Schwartz’s interpretation of  the 1936-37 
increase in member bank reserve requirements as the major cause of the 1937-38 recession there 
is surprisingly little straightforward evidence on this issue, perhaps because data limitations and 
structural instability precludes econometric modeling. We exploit a simple alternative, 
comparing member banks with nonmember banks not subject to changes in reserve 
requirements. The results support the hypothesis that the increase in reserve requirements 
reduced the availability of bank credit and contributed to the 1937-38 recession. 
 
Key Words: excess reserves, Federal Reserve, Great Depression, reserve requirements, and 
1937-38 recession.  (JEL E32, E65, and N12) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Banking Act of 1935 gave the Federal Reserve the power to double member bank 
reserve requirements. In 1936 and 1937 it used this power to reduce the extraordinarily high 
level of excess reserves. It did so not to reduce the then prevailing level of bank credit or the 
money supply, but to avoid excessive credit growth in the future. This action has, however, been 
blamed for generating, or at least exacerbating the short but sharp recession of 1937-38.  It has 
generated much debate, mainly because of its bearing on the role of monetary policy in the Great 
Depression 
 The main issue in this debate is whether banks held the excess reserves because they 
lacked profitable lending opportunities, or because they wanted to hold large precautionary 
balances. The difficulty in distinguishing between these two possibilities is that no adequate  
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measure of the demand for bank credit is available. To avoid this problem we compare the 
reserve behavior of member and a subset of nonmember banks which were not subject to the 
higher reserve requirements.  The data are biannual for the period from June 1934 to June 1941.  
If member banks increased their total reserve ratios because of a decline in the demand for bank 
credit, then on the reasonable assumption that there was no concurrent change in the relative 
volume of credit demand from member and nonmember banks, the total reserve and loan ratios 
of member banks and nonmember banks should have behaved in the same way at the time when 
member bank reserve requirements where raised.  By contrast, if member banks held their large 
excess reserves as precautionary balances, and responded to the increased reserve requirements 
by restoring their excess reserves, then relative to nonmember banks their cash reserve ratios 
would have increased and their loan ratios would have decreased.  
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Prior to the 1935 Banking Act member bank required reserve ratios were set by 
legislation, and differed (as they did for a long time afterwards) depending upon whether a bank 
was located in one of the two central reserve cities (New York and Chicago), a reserve city 
(there were about 50 of these with the exact number varying over time), or elsewhere. Reserve 
requirements for nonmember banks varied from state to state, both in their level and in their 
composition.  For example, some states allowed their banks to hold a certain proportion of their 
required reserves in U.S. government securities or in securities issued by that state. Others 
required vault cash and interbank deposits. This makes it impossible to calculate excess reserve  
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ratios for nonmember banks in a manner that would be comparable to the excess reserve ratios 
for member banks. 
As Table 1 shows, in 1936 the Fed raised reserve requirements of member banks on both 
demand and time deposits by 50 percent.  In 1937 it raised the requirements on demand and time 
deposits by a further 33 percent, thus doubling them from their 1935 level. This still left the 
banking system as a whole with sufficient reserves to meet its legal requirements, though some 
banks in large cities had insufficient reserves (Roos, 1954, p. 104). But, with a lag of several 
quarters, member banks sold securities thereby restoring their excess reserves. Then, in April 
1938, two months before the trough of the 1937-38 recession, the Fed lowered average reserve 
requirements on demand deposits by about 13 percent and on time deposits by 17 percent, only 
to raise them again in November 1941 back to double the 1935 level. This last change is 
excluded from our regression sample because there is only one subsequent observation 
(December 1941), and that observation is for just after the Pearl Harbor attack. Excess reserves 
for reserve city and country banks began to rise in 1934, declined from mid-1936 to the latter 
part of 1937, then rose and stayed high for the rest of the decade (See Figure 1). 
 
3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that most of these legally excess reserves were not 
excess in an economic sense: banks wanted to hold them because they were afraid of further 
bank runs, having learned from their experience in 1930-33 that they could not rely on the Fed to 
act as a lender of last resort.  The causes of the large excess reserves were also discussed by 
other researchers in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Brunner and Meltzer, 1968; Frost, 1971;  
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Horwich, 1963; and Morrison, 1966), and  in recent years there has been a resurgence of interest 
in these excess reserves (e.g., Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Graham, 1995; Lindley, Sowell, and 
Mounts, 2001; Meltzer, 2003; Mounts, Sowell, and Saxena, 2000; Ramos, 1996; and, Telser, 
2000-2001).
1 
  Among these only Morrison (1966, pp. 45-47) proceeded, in part, by comparing the 
reserve ratios of member and nonmember banks. He concluded that the difference in their total 
reserve ratios after the 1936-37 increases was approximately equal to the additional reserves that 
nonmember banks would have had to hold had their reserve requirements increased like those of 
member banks. Hence, he argued, it was the increased reserve requirements that accounted for 
the higher total reserve ratios (and thus the approximately unchanged excess reserve ratios) of 
member banks. But Morrison's results are unconvincing because he did not control for other 
variables that could account for the difference and more consequentially he assumed that reserve 
requirements of nonmember banks were constant. However, in only 17 of the 48 states can one 
be confident that the state requirements did not change in the 1930s.
2 
The view that the increase in reserve requirements caused the sharp downturn in 1937-38 
appears to have become conventional wisdom despite little direct evidence beyond that offered 
by Friedman and Schwartz and Morrison.  In a recent review of a book on the Great Depression, 
Field (2003, p. 289), in summarizing the discussion of Fed policy in the second half of the 1930s, 
stated:  “The downturn in 1937/38 is attributed conventionally to misguided monetary 
stringency…” Mishkin (2004, p. 422) in the currently most popular money and banking textbook 
discussed the increase in reserve requirements as follows: “So not only does it appear that the  
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Fed was at fault for the severity of the Great Depression contraction in 1929-1933, but to add 
insult to injury, it appears that it was also responsible for aborting the subsequent recovery.” 
It is tempting to view this discussion as part of the Keynesian-monetarist debate, with 
monetarists claiming that the Fed could have controlled the money supply if it had really tried, 
and is therefore responsible for the severity of the Great Depression, and some Keynesians 
arguing that banks would not have turned any additional reserves into earning assets, and 
deposits. But this simple picture needs qualification. By no means all Keynesians confused 
legally and economically excess reserves.  Tobin (1965, p. 482) noted in his review article of 
Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History that most economists (who at the time of Tobin's 
review were predominantly Keynesians) believed that the increase in reserve requirements had 
been "too drastic", which implies that banks were not in a liquidity trap.  Conversely, a 
monetarist could concede that the excess reserves of the late 1930s resulted primarily from an 
insufficient demand for bank credit, but could treat that as a special case resulting from the 
massive bank failures in 1930-33 and the shock to expectations caused by the restrictive 
monetary policy of prior years (Morrison, 1966, p. 53).  Moreover, Friedman and Schwartz did 
not advocate a monocausal explanation for the pile-up of excess reserves, but allowed a role for 
the demand for credit and low interest rates, and thus a role for a low marginal efficiency of 
investment, as part of the explanation.
3   Likewise, Meltzer (2003) suggested that certain 





4. THE DATA 
Since data on the excess reserve ratios of nonmember banks are not available we 
compare instead a proxy for the total reserve ratios of member banks and a proxy for the total 
reserve ratios of nonmember banks.  This is feasible because the two traditional  hypotheses can 
be reformulated in terms of total reserves; one asserting that as reserve requirements increased, 
member banks wanted to increase their total reserve ratios to maintain their excess reserve ratios, 
and the other asserting that even though reserve requirements were increased, member banks 
wanted to keep their total reserves unchanged, and meet the increased requirement by reducing 
their excess reserves, but were prevented from doing so by an inadequate demand for bank 
credit.  
 The idea of an “inadequate demand for bank credit” is vague and lacks foundation in 
maximizing behavior, but that is the way in which the Keynesian consensus prior to the 
publication of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) was formulated. More recently Calomiris and 
Wilson (forthcoming) have formulated the problem of how banks managed their balance sheets 
in the 1930s in a much more sophisticated way by treating banks as balancing at the margin the 
cost of losing deposits if their riskyness increases with the costs of (a) issuing more capital, or 
(b) switching from risky assets, such as loans, into riskless assets. While this analysis greatly 
advances our understanding of bank behavior, it does not address the topic of this paper, because 
Calomiris and Wilson in effect combined all low-risk and riskless assets into a single asset. Their 
model therefore does not address the question of why banks held such large excess reserves 
rather than other riskless or low-risk assets.  
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Testing the two traditional hypotheses by comparing the total reserve ratios of member 
and nonmember banks is valid only if the reserve requirements of nonmember banks did not 
change when those of member banks did. Compilations of state reserve requirements were 
published only in 1930, 1937 and 1944 (Board of Governors, 1930, 1937, and 1944).  
Accordingly, our sample consists of nonmember banks in 17 states which had the same reserve 
requirements in all three years
4. This does not guarantee they were unchanged for the entire 1930 
- 1941 period, but it seems highly likely. No information is available on the stringency with 
which state banking authorities enforced their requirements, but there is no reason to assume that 
any variation in this stringency is correlated with changes in member bank reserve 
requirements
5. 
  The FDIC provides call-report data for member and nonmember insured banks in each 
state for June 30 and December 31 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, various dates).  
These data can be used to calculate the following three definitions for member and nonmember 
banks: 
(1) Cash reserves = Vault cash + Balances with other domestic banks and the Fed 
+ Cash items in process of collection 
  (2) Deposits = Demand Deposits + Time Deposits + Government Deposits 
     + Interbank Deposits
6 – Cash items in process of collection 
  (3) Cash reserve ratio = Cash reserves/ Deposits 
  The cash reserve ratio (CRR) is the proxy used here for total reserves. The denominator 
corresponds to the deposit measure against which member and nonmember banks had to hold 
reserves. The numerator corresponds to neither the definition of reserves applicable to member  
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or nonmember banks. It differs from the former by including interbank deposits, and it differs 
from the latter by excluding the U.S. government securities and state securities that nonmember 
banks could count as reserves in some states.
7 It is therefore a compromise measure required by 
the different way in which reserves were defined for member and nonmember banks, and by the 
absence of data that would allow a reconciliation between the two.  Figure 2 presents the average 
computed cash reserve ratio for member and nonmember banks for the 17 states from June 1934 
to December 1941.  The increased gap between member and nonmember bank ratios is evident 
after reserve requirements were increased. 
Relative shifts in the cash reserve ratio reflect portfolio adjustments of the type 
hypothesized by Friedman and Schwartz.  A simple model of the demand by banks for cash 
reserve assets and other assets can be written as: 
(4) CRA/TA = a + bicra + cioa     if CRA/TA > x 
(5) CRA/TA = x                    if CRA/TA ≤ x 
where CRA/TA is the ratio of cash assets to total assets, icra the yield (both monetary and 
imputed) on cash assets, ioa the yield on other assets, and x the required reserve ratio.  
Expressions (4) and (5) can be written separately for member and nonmember banks.  The model 
cannot be estimated directly because measures of icra and ioa are not available, and the Treasury 
bill rate is not an acceptable proxy
8.
  And even if such data were available the low frequency of 
the data and the resulting scarcity of  observations, as well as the presumably volatile 
expectations generated by the uncertainty of the 1930s, would argue against trying to develop an 
explicit model of  bank behavior. The usual procedure of assuming that expectations are rational 
is not applicable here because that requires  assuming either that banks have learned the  
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underlying model, or that their learning process can be specified. 
However, the above framework can still provide insight into the relative portfolio choices 
of member and nonmember banks, since for our sample of nonmember banks, x remained 
constant.  Assuming the yield variables and their parameters are the same for member and 
nonmember banks, one can test whether changes in x for member banks shifted their portfolio 
choice from the unconstrained state of expression (4) to the constrained state of expression (5) 
and thus affected their CRA/TA ratios, by seeing if for member banks this ratio changed relative 
to that for nonmember banks whose x variable did not change
9. We therefore used as our 
dependent variable the difference in the cash reserve ratios of member and nonmember banks. 
Evidence that when the reserve requirements of member banks increased the cash ratio of 
member banks increased relative to that of nonmember banks is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the Fed bears significant responsibility for the 1937-38 recession. And so is a showing that 
the loan ratio (loans to total assets) of member banks declined relative to that of nonmember 
banks. 
 
 5. THE REGRESSIONS  
To determine the impact of reserve requirement increases on the difference in the cash 
ratios we estimated a regression set combining state cross-section and time series data from June 
1934 to June 1941, where the variables for member and nonmember banks are denoted by the 
subscripts “mem” and “non” respectively. 
 (6)       CRRmem- CRRnon  =  b0  +a1(∆RR) + b2(Smem –Snon)  + b3(TDRmem-TDRnon) + 
b4(IBDRmem –IBDRnon) + b5,1…16 (SD) + b6(IP)  
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 The  variable  ∆RR is the percentage point change in member bank reserve requirements in 
December 1936, June 1937, and June 1938 over their 1935 level.
10 That is, if the reserve 
requirement was 10 percent in 1935 and increased to 12.6 percent as of December 1936, the 
variable ∆RR is 2.6.  Since the reserve requirement ratio for nonmember banks in our sample 
was constant during this period, ∆RR also measures the percentage point change in the 
difference between the required reserve ratio of member and nonmember banks.  Until December 
1936 ∆RR is zero, then it becomes 2.6 where it stays until June 1937 when it rises to 6.6.  It then 
falls to 4.8 in June 1938, where it remains until the end of the sample period.  The other variables 
are control variables: S is bank size measured by average assets; TDR is the ratio of time 
deposits to total deposits; IBDR is the ratio of interbank to total deposits; SD is a state dummy 
variable; and IP is a macroeconomic control variable defined as the monthly Index of Industrial 
Production for a six months period beginning one month before the call report date. The state 
dummy variable SD accounts for differences among the states in the definition of deposits and 
reserves, as well as the extent to which reserve requirements were enforced.  
Any observed changes in the relative size of member bank and nonmember banks reserve 
ratios could have been the result of deposit shifts between types of banks with different reserve 
requirements. For member banks shifts of deposits between different types of banks were  
relatively small. For nonmember banks such data are not available. But, fortunately, in 9 of the 
17 states in our sample reserve requirements were the same for all types of nonmember banks. 
For the other 8 states we rely on our control variables (bank size, the time deposit ratio and the 
interbank deposit ratio) to pick up the effects of deposit shifts.  
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  In an imperfect capital market bank loans play a special role, and it may be much more 
damaging to economic activity if banks respond to an increase in reserve requirements by 
reducing bank loans than by reducing their security holdings. To investigate the effect of the 
reserve requirement changes on the supply of bank loans we used the same set of regressors as 
above with the ratio of loans to total assets as the dependent variable. That is: 
 (7)       LOANmem- LOANnon  =  b0  +a1(∆RR) + b2(Smem –Snon)  + b3(TDRm/m-TDRnon) + 
b4(IBDRmem –IBDRnon) + b5,1…16 (SD) + b6(IP) 
Three additional factors need to be considered: first, the possible asymmetry in the 
response of banks to increases and decreases in reserve requirements; second, the effect of 
changing reserve requirements on expectations; and third, the lag in the response of banks to the 
increase in reserve requirements. 
There is no satisfactory way of testing for an asymmetric response with only two increases 
in reserve requirements interrupted by only one relatively small decrease combined with the 
small number of data points. 
Reserve requirements might have affected aggregate demand by changing expectations. 
Agents might have believed that the 1936-37 increase in reserve requirements would generate a 
recession, or they might have become more optimistic when they saw the Fed taking action 
against potential inflation. Similarly, when the Fed lowered reserve requirements in 1938 they 
might have interpreted that as an indication that the recession would be brief, or as an indication 
that the Fed feared that the recession would get worse. But a review of news reports and 
editorials in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times suggests neither a large negative or 
positive effect on expectations  - see Appendix  1 available upon request
11.  
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  The variable ∆RR incorporates an implicit lag of a month or two because of the June and 
December observations followed the announcement and effective date of the reserve requirement 
change.  An additional,  explicit lag may be appropriate, however.  Considering the time from 
when the reserve requirement changes were announced and when they became effective a six 
months explicit lag – the minimum lag  (other than zero) that our data permit – combined with 
our implicit lag, should provide sufficient time for banks to have adjusted their cash ratios, 
though not necessarily their loan ratios. But we cannot be certain, and therefore ran regressions 
with zero, 6 months and 12 months lags, though we consider the 12 months case less plausible 
than the others.  These lags are much shorter than those suggested by Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963, p. 543) who concluded, apparently from a visual inspection of the data, that: 
[I]t takes some seven months for banks to adjust to an unanticipated discrepancy between their 
actual and desired reserve positions produced by a change in their actual position, and some 
three years for banks to carry through a thoroughgoing revision of their reserve position as a 
result of a change in their desired position. 
 
Friedman and Schwartz, however, did not present independent evidence for such long lags. Their 
argument is that since lags have to be that long to reconcile the data with their interpretation of 
excess reserves one must conclude that the lags are that long. But one could equally well 
conclude that their interpretation of the excess reserves is wrong. 
Morrison (1966) also found a very long lag in reserve adjustments after financial panics. 
He attributed this to the difficulty of quickly liquidating enough earning assets, and to the time 
required for banks to revise their expectations of the volume of earning assets they can 
reasonably hold. He argued that banks may regard "a large proportion" of a change in potential 
deposits "as too temporary to warrant a corresponding change in actual deposits", except if it is  
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necessary to meet higher reserve requirements (Morrison, 1966, p. 59).  Morrison’s argument is 
applicable at most to the 1936 increase, since following the 1937 increase banks did not have to 
be concerned about further increases in reserve requirements -- the 1937 increase had already 
brought the required reserve ratio to its statutory maximum (Tobin, 1965).  Morrison's work is, 
however, a useful warning that different disturbances that impinge on bank reserve ratios may 
generate quite different adjustment lags. Calomiris and Wilson (forthcoming)  also found a long 
lag in the portfolio adjustments of banks. But the portfolio adjustments they discussed  are  
adjustments in the ratio of risky to safe assets and in the capital/deposit ratio. One would expect 
the adjustment between cash assets and other safe assets to be much faster. 
 
6. REGRESSION RESULTS 
The data set is a nearly balanced panel of cross-section and time series data with 17 states 
and 15 time periods for each state.  The regression coefficients and standard errors of expression 
(6) and (7) were estimated by a fixed-effects estimator designed for panel data and a robust 
errors estimator to adjust the standard errors for nonrandom behavior in the error term.
12 The 
fixed-effects estimator suppresses the constant term in expressions (6) and (7) and does not 
explicitly provide estimates of the dummy variable coefficients, while the robust estimator 
includes the constant term and the state dummy variables.  The regression coefficients for the 
two estimators are the same; however, the robust errors estimator adjusts the standard errors for a 
wide range of nonrandom behaviors in the error term.  Although we consider them less 
appropriate given our data set we also present  the results for AR1 regressions, both with 
constant and with varying RHO’s for each state.  The complete set of results, including  
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regressions that define the dependent variable as the ratio of these two ratios rather than the 
difference as in expression (6) and (7), are in Appendix 2 available upon request.  
Table 2 presents the coefficients and t values of ∆RR and the R
2 for the four estimators of 
expression (6) and (7) with no explicit lag, a 6 month lag, and a 12 month lag.  The regressions 
account for a substantial percentage of variation in the dependent variable and the signs and 
significance of the control variables were not unusual.  In general, while the specific control 
variables were not individually significant they were significant at the 5 percent level as a group. 
The macro control variable was negative and significant for the 0 month lag regression, but 
insignificant for the 6 and 12 month lag regression. 
 The  ∆RR variable is positive in all of the reserve ratio regressions and significant at the 5 
percent level in all but one regression
13. In that case it is significant at the 10 percent level. The 
∆RR variable is negative in all of the loan ratio regressions and significant at the 5 percent level 
in all but one regression where it just misses significance. 
 The  ∆RR variable is not only statistically significant but large enough to be economically 
significant, when its impact on the reserve and loan ratio is evaluated at the tails of the 
distribution. The ∆RR variable is measured in percentage point changes of the reserve 
requirement ratio, so that a coefficient of 0.75 for the cash ratio (Table 2, fixed effects coefficient 
at 0 months lag) means that the cash ratio increased by 0.75 percentage points for each 1 
percentage point increase in the required reserves ratio. Focusing on the 1937 increase in reserve 
requirements as described in footnote 10, the mean cash reserve ratio increased by 6.6 
percentage points over its 1935 level or given a 0.75 coefficient it raised the mean reserve 
requirement of member banks by 4.95 percentage points over the 1935 level.  Table 3 presents  
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this calculation for the 1937 increase for the entire set of fixed-effects estimates, which we 
regard as the most reasonable of the four estimators.  The calculations for the point estimates of 
the coefficients suggest a 2.95 to 4.92 percentage point increase in the cash reserves ratio and a 
2.55 to 4.07 decrease in the loan ratio of member banks in 1937 over the 1935 level depending 
upon the lag model used.  Table 3 also presents the same calculation for the point coefficient 
estimate plus and minus one and two standard errors.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
  These results combined with the impressions suggested by Figure 2 do not support the 
claim that banks responded to the changes in reserve requirements essentially by changing their 
excess reserves.  Instead, they support the hypothesis that member banks met a substantial part 
of their increased reserve requirements by reducing their earning assets, including loans.  This 
strongly suggests that the decision to raise reserve requirements in 1936 and 1937 contributed to 
the 1937-38 recession.  This finding does not rule at out factors such as fiscal policy and 
unbalance inventories as contributed to recession, but monetary policy was an important 
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1. Roos (1954, pp. 302-303) provides a survey of the earlier literature. Hirsch and de Machi 
1990, pp. 233) referred to Friedman and Schwartz's discussion of banks' response to the higher 
reserve requirements as one of their three "crucial experiments" showing the causal primacy of 
money.  See Temin (1976) and Mayer (1978) for more detail on the debate over the causes of the 
Great Depression. 
 
2. The significance of our test does not depend on the size of nonmember bank deposits. Instead, 
the fulcrum of our test is that the increase in the reserve requirements of one type of bank, and 
not of the other, provides a natural experiment for seeing how higher reserve requirements 
affected the banks subjected to them. 
 
3. Thus they wrote: 
 
 "The increased fraction of bank assets held in the form of cash assets ...  can be partially 
explained by supply considerations. ... [A] lagged reaction to the gold inflow may have 
contributed to the increase. More important, because longer lasting, rates of interest in 
general fell, which made cash assets more attractive compared to other assets. ...  
Moreover, the shift in preferences depressed particularly the yields on short-term highly 
liquid assets. ... At those yields it was hardly worthwhile to hold bills instead of cash. In 
consequence ... the ratio of cash assets to total assets continued to rise until 1940. While 
supply considerations explain part of the shift into cash assets, they cannot explain the 
whole of the shift, which was motivated also by the same desire for liquidity as the shift 
into investments. ... [After] 1936, the acquisition of cash assets became the most 
convenient and least costly way to achieve the desired liquidity. (Friedman and Schwartz, 
1963, p. 457) 
 
4. They are: Alabama, California, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia and Wyoming. This does not necessarily mean that all other states changed their reserve 
requirements; for some states the information provided was insufficient to decide, and we 
excluded them from the sample. It is also possible that the total reserve ratios of nonmember 
banks were affected by the changes in member bank required reserves. Nonmember banks could  
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have felt competitive pressure to raise their total reserves to enhance the safety of their deposits. 
But it is far from obvious that higher reserve requirements significantly raised the safety of 
member bank deposits. By reducing potential bank earnings they could also have increased the 
likelihood of bank failure. 
 
5. There is the problem of window dressing in which banks adjust their asset mix just before the 
call-report dates to improve the appearance of their balance sheets. This problem is likely to have 
been more severe for nonmember banks since some states may have enforced their reserve 
requirements only at specific dates, such as the call-report dates. 
 
6. For the banking system as a whole, interbank deposits do, of course, equal balances with 
banks other than the Fed. But that is not so for member banks or nonmember banks taken 
separately. 
 
7. These states are California, Georgia, Nebraska and Massachusetts. States generally limited the 
proportion of reserves that could be held in securities and in interbank deposits. 
 
8. It would not be correct to assume that, since at the margin net expected yields on all assets 
must be equal, the Treasury bill rate provides an adequate proxy for all yields. Bill rates when 
compared to loan rates contain large imputed yields in terms of liquidity and safety that may 
fluctuate. An attempt to estimate a fully specified model would also run into a causality problem; 
while interest rates affect the excess reserves that banks demand, these excess reserves also 
affect interest rates. 
 
9. The assumption the yields and their coefficients are the same for member and nonmember 
banks is actually somewhat stricter than required. If the coefficients are the same, then all that is 
required is that the ratio of the yields that member banks obtain on earning assets and on excess 
reserves relative to these yields for nonmember banks remain constant, or conversely, if the 
yields are not constant, then the ratio of their coefficients is constant. 
 
10. The reserve-requirement changes were calculated as weighted averages for time deposits and 
demand deposits in country and reserve city banks. The sample does not include any states with 
central reserve cities. The weights used are the deposits (Board of Governors, 1943, pp. 97-103) 
at the first observation at which the new requirement became effective. We made no adjustments 
for the changes in the average required reserve ratio that occurred at other times due a shift in the 
composition of deposits. It would be preferable to compare state banks only with member 
country banks since nonmember banks were smaller than reserve city banks and functioned more 
like country banks, but the relevant data for country banks are not available. The date used for 
the reserve-requirement changes was the first call-report date following the date on which the 
new requirements became effective. (This is the same as the first call report date following the 
announcement of the increase.)  
 
11. Appendix 1 and 2 are available at tcargill@att.net. 
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12. These procedures were run with RATS, version 5 (Estima, 2000). 
 
13.  One reader of an earlier version suggested that the change in relative cash ratios might have 
reflected a shift in holdings of government securities.  This is unlikely since the ratio of 
government securities to assets for member and nonmember banks remained relatively stable 
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Table 1: Reserve Requirements for Member Banks 
          
          
Announcement Date   July  January    April   
    14, 1936  30, 1937    15, 1938   
          
Effective Date 
June 21, 1917 
to August 15, 
1936 
August 16, 
1936 to Feb 28, 
1937 
March 1, 1937 
to April 30, 
1937 
May 1, 1937 
to April 15, 
1938 
April 16, 1938 
to October 31, 
1941 
Nov 1, 1941 
to Dec 31, 
1941 
          
Net Demand Deposits          
          
Central Reserve City Banks  13.00 19.50 22.75 26.00 22.25 26.00
  Percent Change Relative             
  To 1936 Requirement    50% 75% 100% 71% 100%
          
Reserve City Banks  10.00 15.00 17.50 20.00 17.50 20.00
  Percent Change Relative             
  To 1936 Requirement    50% 75% 100% 75% 100%
          
Country Banks  7.00 10.50 12.25 14.00 12.00 14.00
  Percent Change Relative             
  To 1936 Requirement    50% 75% 100% 71% 100%
          
Time Deposits          
          
All Member Banks  3.00 4.50 5.25 6.00 5.00 6.00
  Percent Change Relative             
  To 1936 Requirement    50% 75% 100% 67% 100%
          
Source: Board of Governors (1943)           
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Table 2: Coefficient Estimates and t Values for ∆RR and R
2 Value 
                   
  Fixed Effects  Robust Errors  AR1 Constant Rho  AR1 Varying Rho 
                   
  Coeff T-Value    Coeff T-Value    Coeff T-Value    Coeff T-Value 
                    
Explicit Lag on ∆RR  Dependent Variable Defined as CRRmember - CRRnonmember 
                   
0  Months  0.75 4.91  0.75 4.51  0.70 3.77  0.68 4.46 
Adjusted  R
2   0.69    0.69    0.72    0.73 
                   
6 Months  0.60 4.66  0.60 4.95  0.50 3.23  0.49 3.86 
Adjusted  R
2   0.68    0.68    0.72    0.73 
                   
12 Months  0.45 3.64  0.45 4.20  0.28 1.86  0.31 2.51 
Adjusted  R
2   0.67    0.67    0.71    0.72 
                   
  Dependent Variable Defined as LOANmember - LOANnonmember 
                   
0 Months  -0.39 -2.62  -0.39 -2.57  -0.29 -1.48  -0.33 -1.89 
Adjusted  R
2   0.69    0.69    0.72    0.74 
                   
6 Months  -0.48 -3.92  -0.48 -3.90  -0.34 -2.19  -0.42 -3.00 
Adjusted  R
2   0.70    0.70    0.73    0.74 
                   
12 Months  -0.62 -5.55  -0.62 -6.60  -0.53 -3.74  -0.65 -5.39 
Adjusted  R




Table 3: Percentage Point Change in the Memberbank Cash Ratio and 
Loan Ratio in 1937 as a Result of the 1937 Increase in Reserve Requirements 
of 6.6 Percentage Points over the 1935 Level 
             
Cash Reserve Ratio 
            
Explicit Point      Plus    Minus 
Lag  Estimate    1 S.E.  2 S.E.    1 S.E.  2 S.E. 
              
0 4.92    5.92  6.93    3.92  2.92 
                
1 3.95    4.80  5.64    3.10  2.26 
                 
2 2.95    3.76  4.56    2.14  1.33 
            
            
Loan Ratio 
            
Explicit Point    Plus    Minus 
Lag  Estimate    1 S.E.  2 S.E.    1 S.E.  2 S.E. 
              
0  -2.55   -1.58  -0.61  -3.53  -4.50 
                   
1  -3.16   -2.35  -1.55  -3.96  -4.77 
                   
2  -4.07   -3.33  -2.60  -4.80  -5.53 
 